What is the best level at which to describe human cognition? We could describe it using mathematical formalisms (like Bayesian statistics) at Marr's (1982) computational level by specifying the sources of information in the world and our own inductive biases that we draw on to make inferences and choose actions in the world. We could describe human cognition at the algorithmic level using the language of computer science, describing how people represent data, and what procedures operate over these representations to make the required computations. We could instead adopt the language of electrical engineering and talk about the neural signals, systems, and circuits that are the physiological instantiations of the algorithmic description. We could reduce further to the level of biochemistry, where we describe the individual neurotransmitters, ion channels, and chemical gradients that allow neurons to pass information between one another and generate action potentials. Of course, we needn't stop there, as those individual neurotransmitter molecules and ions comprise atoms and subatomic particles.
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So, how do we decide at which level of abstraction to operate? Because models at higher and lower orders of abstractions are all likely to be wrong, we can only answer this question practically, by hoping that some of these models are useful for predicting or manipulating some target phenomenon. When approached from such an engineering perspective, there are specific costs and benefits to operating at each level. Even in physics-a model of reductionist success-when dealing with a higher order abstraction (like classical mechanics), we will fail to account for some subtleties that would be captured at a finer scale (quantum interactions), which could end up playing an important role in the phenomenon of interest. When dealing with lower abstractions (such as particle physics), we face a vast computational challenge when trying to describe higher order phenomena (like how a ball will bounce). Thus, physical models at different levels of abstraction will prove to be more or less useful depending on the phenomenon of interest, so different abstractions are emphasized in astrophysics, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, and quantum computing.
These trade-offs apply to predicting human cognition. If we want to predict whether a given drug will increase dopamine in Parkinson's patients, psychological and cognitive neuroscience descriptions are practically useless: Our question is about biochemical interactions, so biochemical descriptions of the brain provide the most useful basis for psychopharmacology. In contrast, if we want to tell a neurosurgeon where to cut to avoid damaging the patient's capacity for speech, biochemical and psycholinguistic descriptions are useless; however, theories and data from cognitive neuroscience, indicating which parts of the brain are more involved in speech production and comprehension provide the most relevant abstraction and can fruitfully guide surgery. If, however, we focus on a complex human behavior, for instance, to find the best teaching schedule in a classroom, we derive this prediction neither from the biochemical processes underlying long-term potentiation and long-term depression nor from our cognitive neuroscience descriptions of hippocampo-cortical storage loops; instead, psychological accounts of forgetting curves, testing, and spacing effects yield a powerful basis for prediction.
Connecting these different levels of description is a necessary and fruitful research enterprise. We are reassured of our scientific models at higher levels of abstraction (like trichromacy-the theory that that human color vision is three-dimensional) when those models may be derived from properties at lower orders of abstraction (the existence of three cone types). Similarly, we are reassured that we are measuring relevant properties of complexly interacting elements (like receptive field size of V1 cells) when those properties can be simplified to abstractions about the important behaviors of the system as a whole (cortical magnification and the falloff of acuity with eccentricity). Thus, connecting levels of description validates models at both levels of abstraction, so there is a scientific demand for a single unified model of human behavior, cognition, and neuroscience by reducing cognitive theories to their biological underpinnings. However, there is no reason to expect that even when the levels of abstraction are united through reductionism that one level of description will emerge as the most fundamental, useful, or practical.
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